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ABSTRACT Outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin America have integration attempts
and thinking developed so extensively across space and so consistently over time. This
article introduces the historical waves of Latin American regionalism in order to discuss
the theories applied to account for, and frequently advocate, regional integration. The
aim is twofold: on the one hand, to assess the capacity to travel of theories that have
been crafted for the EU; on the other, to draw lessons from the Latin American experi-
ences that may contribute to advance integration theory in general and EU studies in
particular.
KEY WORDS: Latin America, EU studies, regional integration, regionalism, 
neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism
Philippe C. Schmitter arrived in Berkeley in 1961, where he was unexpect-
edly offered a job as Ernst Haas’s research assistant. According to a reliable
source, ‘this had nothing to do with Schmitter’s substantive qualifications …
but with the fact that Haas had learned somewhere that Schmitter spoke
Spanish. Haas had the strange idea of trying to apply neofunctionalism to the
recently formed Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin
American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), which Schmitter did not even know
existed’ (Haas et al. 2008, 1–2). This is how integration theory first arrived
in Latin America: rather impulsively and unexpectedly, but early on and
under the leadership of one of its founding fathers — and his would-be heir.
To be sure, systematic thinking and political advocacy for Latin American
integration had already set foot in the region, especially since Argentine econ-
omist Raúl Prebisch was appointed director of the UN Economic Commission
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638 Andrés Malamud
for Latin America (ECLA) in 1948. In 1950 he published The Economic
Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, which became a
cornerstone of the region’s economic thinking and inspired the integration
projects that were launched in the following three decades. Between 1964 and
1969 Prebisch served as the founding secretary-general of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Odd bedfellows who
never met personally, an economist from the periphery (Prebisch) and a polit-
ical scientist from the center (Haas) became the pioneers of modern Latin
American integration. This article deals with their legacy.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, I introduce the historical
waves of regionalism that developed in Latin America from the mid-twenti-
eth century; second, I discuss the theories applied to account for, and
frequently advocate, Latin American integration; finally, I draw lessons from
the Latin American experiences that may contribute to advance integration
theory in general and European studies in particular.
In Prebisch’s Footsteps: The History of Latin American Integration
The unity of Latin America has long been an omnipresent component of the
regional political discourse. As Mace (1988, 404) points out, ‘the wars for
independence were not yet over before proposals for political unity began to
be heard throughout the newly independent territories’. Simón Bolívar, the
Venezuelan liberator, established his belief in a sort of United States of
Hispanoamérica in his messages to the Congresses of Angostura (1819) and
Panama (1826), which can be considered as the first attempts at continental
integration. However, the real unity of Hispanic Latin America was never
anything but a myth. Although most of the region shared a common culture,
language and religion, the divisive factors were prevalent. Among the natural
obstacles, huge distances were paramount and made communications
extremely difficult. The social obstacles were also grave: Spain had developed
an administrative system aimed at extracting resources and controlling the
territory from a single center. Consequently, its American colonies were
seldom connected to one another, and territorial as well as regulative disputes
were conducive to rivalry and competition. This is why the end of the inde-
pendence wars led to civil strife and the division of Hispanic South America
into nine independent countries. Central America, though of a much smaller
size, followed a similar pattern of fragmentation, Mexico standing as the only
original viceroyalty that managed to conserve most of its territory. On the
other hand, Portugal’s larger but only colony — Brazil — managed to keep
its unity.
The failure of further attempts at political unification led to the emergence
of pan-Americanism, a softer notion of continental union for the manage-
ment of international relations. After World War II, the emphasis changed
from political unity to economic integration. Many factors were responsible
for this turn, among them the functionalist argument that international orga-
nization would be better served by functional arrangements in economic,
social, and cultural affairs than by political or federal integration. At any
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Latin American Regionalism and EU Studies 639
rate, the decisive thrust toward Latin American integration came from the
ECLA (Wionczek 1970; Mace 1988).1
The ECLA’s proposal aimed at the enlargement of national markets
through the constitution of a common market. The coalition of technicians
and reformist politicians led by Prebisch considered that economic coopera-
tion was the only means to overcoming traditional dependence on primary
commodity export trade. As the previous model of development — so-called
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) — was reaching its limits within the
national markets, larger markets entailing economic diversification and tech-
nological modernization were necessary for further development (Wionczek
1970). Other accounts also mention the creation of the European Community
as triggering integrative efforts, on grounds that the resulting trade diversion
was damaging Latin American countries that were primary-commodity
exporters (Mattli 1999).
The ECLA drive for regional integration came about in two waves. The
first one saw the establishment of LAFTA and CACM in 1960; the second
led to the creation of the Andean Pact (later CAN) in 1969 and the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) in 1973. A third wave took place later, as the tran-
sitions to democracy developed from the 1980s onwards, and saw the
creation of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the relaunch-
ing of both the CACM and the CAN. Labeled ‘open regionalism’, as they
aimed to combine regional preference with extra-regional openness, these
processes achieved early success and most of them are still in existence —
whether slightly or radically changed. Yet none achieved its initial objectives.
Subregional Experiences
LAFTA and LAIA. Shortly after the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (1951) and the European Economic Community (1957), Latin
America was taking its first steps towards regional integration. In 1960
LAFTA, which in 1980 became the Latin American Integration Association
(LAIA), was instituted. Its founding treaty was ratified by six South American
countries — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay — plus
Mexico, aiming at a Latin American common market through a progressive
process of ‘articulation and convergence’ of the subregional integration initi-
atives. Colombia and Ecuador joined LAFTA in 1961, Venezuela in 1966,
and Bolivia in 1967, increasing regional membership to 11.
The LAFTA agreement provided for the creation of a free-trade zone by
means of periodical and selective negotiations between its member states.
This choice — negotiation at the discretion of the member states rather than
automatic reduction of import duties — made the LAFTA trade opening
program develop reasonably well in its first years, lose impetus as of 1965,
and come to a standstill in the 1970s. To make things worse, multilateralism
— a mechanism that obliged countries that reached a bilateral agreement
to expand it further to all the other partners — reduced the advantage of
making concessions, as it required no compensation from third countries
that would benefit without reciprocating.
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640 Andrés Malamud
Yet one of LAFTA’s key principles was reciprocity. This meant the obliga-
tion of the member countries to expand their imports to the same extent as
their exports increase. However, the nonexistence of monitoring institutions,
together with high asymmetry among partners, turned the principle into a
dead letter. As the benefits of integration were soon perceived to favor the
larger countries at the expense of the smaller ones, the latter started to raise
complaints that eventually led to the constitution of a subregional group: the
Andean Pact.
The causes for the failure of LAFTA boil down to regional heterogeneity
and divergent national interests (Wionczek 1970, 64). As Mace (1988, 413)
put it, the organization ‘never really got off the ground and this spill-around
situation was maintained throughout the 1970s until the member countries
decided to transform LAFTA into the Latin American Association for
Integration’. Created in 1980, LAIA used other means to pursue integration.
In place of a free-trade zone, an economic preference zone was established
creating conditions favorable to the growth of bilateral initiatives — as a
necessary prelude to the institution of multilateral relationships in Latin
America. LAIA made possible the establishment of subregional agreements
limited to the countries wishing to carry out joint action, without compelling
them to extend the benefits to third countries. Although the establishment
of a common market was still a long-term objective, the new organization
displayed more realism than the older one. Among its guiding principles,
flexibility and gradualism substituted for fixed reciprocity and automatic
extension to all partners (García Martínez 1987).
Not only did LAIA favor the internal clustering of countries according to
subregional criteria, but it also fostered integration limited to sectors of
production. This fragmentative spirit aimed at building up the region from
its components toward the whole rather than the other way round. LAIA was
slightly more fruitful than its predecessor. It simultaneously framed and
constituted part of the third wave of regional integration in Latin America,
of which Mercosur represents the most visible outcome. The renewing of the
integrative thrust provided by LAIA also helped reinvigorate hitherto dying
regional blocs such as the Andean Pact.
The Central American Common Market (CACM). The Treaty of Managua,
signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, established the
CACM in 1960. Costa Rica joined the bloc in 1963. The agreement origi-
nated not only from economic reasons but also from political causes. Among
them, the perceived threat of the Cuban revolution was highly significant
(Schmitter 1972), and it explains the greater support the new region received
from the US compared to that enjoyed by LAFTA.
Created at the same time as LAFTA, as part of the first wave of regional
integration, the CACM ‘went much further and … was much more respon-
sive to ECLA’s proposals than LAFTA’ (Mace 1988, 411). By the late 1960s
it was widely recognized as ‘the underdeveloped world’s most successful
regional integration effort’ (Wynia 1970, 319). Measured by the growth of
trade within their respective areas, the achievements of the CACM far
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exceeded those of LAFTA. However, it would not last any longer: the so-
called Football War of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras dealt a fatal
blow to the process.
Initially, the CACM performed remarkably well. By 1965 the level and
scope of integration approximated that of a customs union: most internal
tariffs had been abolished, a common external tariff had been created and the
institutional structure was acquiring growing complexity. This progress was
due to technical — i.e. non-politicized — management (Wynia 1970), and to
the low political and economic costs of integration — as it did not threaten
any powerful interests, while the administration expenses were paid by
foreign sources (Nye 1968; Mattli 1999). However, the fragility of these
achievements became apparent as the task of holding the integrative structure
together, rather than expanding it, turned out to be the principal concern of
regional leaders after the boom of the first years. The result was an expansion
in the scope of the tasks performed by an increasing number of regional insti-
tutions, without a concomitant increase in the authority of such institutions
— that is, in the level of regional decision-making. Schmitter (1970) called
this mechanism spill-around, to distinguish it from the expected spill-over,
as neofunctionalists described European integration. The stagnation of the
process was to last two decades.
In the early 1990s, pacification and democratization led to a revival of the
once-moribund CACM (Mattli 1999; Dabène 2009). This time, however, the
US posed a burden to the region, as its participation in NAFTA jeopardized
the Central American markets by privileging partnership with Mexico.
Furthermore, the institutional configuration of the bloc was so cumbersome
that policy coordination was hard to achieve. Institutional development had
been cumulative and non-centralized, and only in 1991 did the Protocol of
Tegucigalpa include most existing organizations under the umbrella of the
Central American Integration System (SICA). The institutionalization of pres-
idential meetings as of 1991 was ‘a key factor in the renewed dynamism of
the cooperation and integration processes in Central America’ (CEPAL-BID
1998, 35). However, it is still a slow process, existing on foreign aid, as most
of its budget is provided by external actors, mainly the European Union.
The Andean Community (CAN). The Andean Pact, predecessor of the
CAN, was established in 1969 within the framework of LAFTA as part of
the second wave of regional integration. Its goals were to improve the condi-
tions for participation of the less developed countries encompassed by the
LAFTA agreements, while simultaneously aiming at the formation of a Latin
American Common Market. Five countries signed its founding treaty,
the Cartagena Agreement: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
Venezuela joined the group in 1973, but Chile withdrew in 1976. In the
1990s, after a period of stagnation and crisis, the process was relaunched and
its institutional structure was strengthened.
The emergence of the Andean Pact was a response to LAFTA’s failure, and
its integration scheme was more far-reaching than anything ever before real-
ized in this field in all of the Third World (Mace 1988). At the economic
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level, it relied on intra-regional trade liberalization and regional industrial
planning. At the political level, it created a decision-making structure includ-
ing the Commission and the Junta, whose respective majority-rule voting and
binding supranational authority were as ambitious as they were exceptional.
An additional element was an extensive program of special treatment for the
less developed countries.
Although the Andean Pact performed quite satisfactorily in its early years,
the enlargement to Venezuela and the withdrawal of Chile generated a
succession of major crises. Given the complexity of the integration scheme,
those events led to the renegotiation of key mechanisms and, in the end, to
the abandonment of the original schedule (Mace 1988). Apart from the
rigidity of the agreements, the failure was due to the unequal distribution of
costs and benefits, the politicization of integration issues, the non-compli-
ance of the member countries with the regional decisions (Vargas-Hidalgo
1979), extended political instability and the lack of regional leadership
(Mattli 1999). One of the recipes proposed to overcome the crisis was to
build up institutions able to settle conflicts between members: the result was
the creation of the Court of Justice and the Andean Parliament in 1979.
However, they lacked real weight and the integration process stalled for a
decade. It was not until all presidents met in 1989 that the region embarked
on a process of deepening and opening. One year later, the setting of the
Andean Presidential Council institutionalized chief executive summits as the
supreme authority of the organization, thus consolidating its relaunch
(Lloreda Ricaurte 1998). Its economic record, however, is far less impres-
sive. Although a free trade zone and a common external tariff have been in
force since the mid-1990s, social turmoil, political instability and economic
crises rather than economic development have been the mark of the region.
The process of Andean integration has increasingly degraded as each country
signed, or is negotiating, bilateral agreements with third parties. Worse, in
2006 Venezuela left the bloc and applied to Mercosur, opening an accession
process that has not finished in 2010.
The Common Market of the South (Mercosur). Mercosur is a regional orga-
nization consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Established
in 1991 by the Asunción Treaty, it is a prominent member of the third wave
of integration. In its first seven years, Mercosur tripled intra-regional trade
flows while simultaneously increasing extra-regional trade flows. In addition,
it boosted direct foreign investment in its member states and became an inter-
national reference for business and foreign governments. However, after
1998 it entered a pattern of cyclical crises and rebounds that have defined it.
Born in the wake of democratization and the removal of old hypotheses of
conflict between Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur developed a new, outwardly
oriented economic profile. In 1995 the Ouro Preto Protocol turned it into a
customs union, with a long-term goal of becoming a common market under
the umbrella of the WTO. To date, however, Mercosur has built a slight insti-
tutional structure. All its decisions are made through intergovernmental mech-
anisms that always require unanimity. The decision-making organization
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consists of three bodies made up of national functionaries or bureaucrats. A
limited dispute settlement system initially provided for an ad hoc mechanism
of arbitration, and although a permanent Court of Appeals was established
in 2004, its intervention is optional and has rarely been called on. Further-
more, neither direct effect nor supremacy of the community norms exists. A
parliament was installed in 2006 but it lacks both representativeness and
competences. Intergovernmentalism was advanced from the foundational
stages in order to protect political leadership from bureaucratic encroach-
ment. The political direction was to be reaffirmed by regular, mandatory pres-
idential summits; as a consequence, presidential diplomacy has become the
crucial driver behind the process (Malamud 2005).
Mercosur treaties deal with economic integration (content) and organiza-
tional structure (form). They do not deal with aspects that have acquired
greater relevance in the EU such as regional citizenship, social cohesion and
democratic decision-making. Lately, some projects have been advanced with
a view towards deeper integration. Apart from the Court and the Parliament,
the launching of an infrastructure building plan in 2000 and the establish-
ment of a tiny convergence fund in 2005 are steps in that direction. At
the same time, a more encompassing initiative aimed at integrating the
whole subcontinent has been launched: the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR). Real integration, however, lags behind: despite its
name, the bloc has not become a common market. At best, it has established
the blueprints for a customs union, but even the free trade agreements are
repeatedly infringed.
Summing up, how has Latin American integration fared half a century
after its start? Let Prebisch talk: regional integration ‘is a matter very close
to my heart. I consider one of the most vital interests of Latin America [is] to
give a strong impulse to this idea. Why has it not advanced beyond a certain
point? It was not a failure. It was not a success. It was a mediocrity, a typical
Latin American mediocrity’ (Pollock et al. 2001, 21). Neither failure nor
success: inconsequential endurance is what theory ought to explain.
In Haas’s Footsteps: The Theorization of Latin American Integration
Following the integration initiatives on the ground, as happened in Europe,
the theorization of Latin American integration developed in waves, which
will be called surges to avoid confusion. Factual waves and theoretical surges
did not completely overlap: the first surge included both ECLA and neofunc-
tionalist approaches and covered the first two waves of integration, from the
1950s and through the 1970s. More than a decade passed before the third
integration wave brought about a theoretical revival, which nurtured two
strands of thinking. One of them focused on the causes for the relaunch and
asked why it started (in the 1990s) or endured (in the 2000s); the other
analyzed the dynamics of the integration processes and asked how they
operated and evolved. They did not always compete with each other as the
research questions they posed allowed, or even called for, different methods
and approaches.
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First Theoretical Surge: ECLA and Neofunctionalism
If Santiago de Chile-based ECLA was the think tank where it all started,
its offspring soon crossed the Andes and installed its headquarters in
Buenos Aires. The Institute for Latin American Integration (INTAL) is a
unit of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) created in 1965 as a
research, consultancy and diffusion agency. Under the aegis of IADB presi-
dent Felipe Herrera, it launched a series of publications that were to
become the most important vehicle of reflection on Latin American inte-
gration for decades.
Most of the INTAL production followed ECLA’s historical-structuralist
approach, a framework that included a great deal of conceptual innovations:
center–periphery relations, deterioration in the terms of trade, structural
imbalance of payments, structural inflation and unemployment, develop-
ment planning, and regional integration (Bielschowsky 1998). However,
INTAL provided a more pluralist environment and was influenced by events
that ECLA’s founders could not have foreseen, such as the oil shocks, the end
of the Cold War and, recently, the emergence of the Global South. INTAL
has dealt with integration through the prism of the economy, mainly focusing
on trade and investment. Although not blind to politics, its grasp is chiefly
technocratic. In contrast, neofunctionalism was to develop greater sensitivity
to political matters.
According to neofunctionalism, regional integration is an intrinsically
sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of
democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find
themselves increasingly entangled in regional interactions and end up resolv-
ing their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority
to the organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens and social
groups will begin shifting their expectations to the region and satisfying them
will increase the likelihood that economic–social integration will ‘spill over’
into political integration (Haas 1958, 1964).
Spillover is a process whereby integration between states in one sector
creates incentives for integration in further sectors in order to fully capture
the benefits of integration in the original sector, and so forth. Although
neofunctionalism was aware of the difference between initial and process
conditions, it ‘had more to say about the ongoing role of institutions than
about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes’ (Hurrell 1995,
60): its focus was on the process. Once integration had started, neofunction-
alism saw it being fostered by two sorts of spillover: functional and political,
as politicization was seen as initially avoidable but later inescapable.
This mechanism predicted that integration would become self-sustaining;
indeed, European integration has been driven as much by intergovernmental
bargains as by unforeseen, interstitial change — that is, structural transfor-
mations brought about by the daily operation of EU institutions rather than
by the strategic calculations of national executives (Farrell and Heritier
2007). However, institutions such as the European Commission, Court
and Parliament were not at the disposal of the Latin American regional
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arrangements. The conditions for spillover to proceed were thus weak, but
this was not evident when the integration processes were launched.
Schmitter (1969) conceived of spillover as being a member of a more
numerous family. Considering scope (coverage of issue areas) and level
(decisional capacity) of authority, spillover indicates the simultaneous incre-
ment in both indicators. Different changes in either or both dimensions
could produce spillback, retrench, muddle about, spillaround, buildup, or
encapsulation (see Table 1). Spillover and buildup were deemed the only
processes conducive to the construction of a political community: notably,
they were the only members of the family that did not exist in Latin America.
In Haas’s view (1967, 343), ‘[t]he primary weakness in the Latin American
integrative process has always been a lack of articulation between técnicos
on the one hand and national decision-makers on the other’. Those capable
technicians inspired by Prebisch and trained by ECLA could not persuade
national leaders of the value of integration, or otherwise overcome their
obstructive behavior. Just as in Europe after the unexpected emergence of
De Gaulle, high politics got in the way of integration and led Haas to
reformulate his theorization. As he saw it, 
a process of integration spurred by the vision, the energy and force of
a Bismarck, a Cavour or a Disraeli is clearly more productive of perma-
nence than an indirect process fed by the slow fuel of economic expec-
tations. On that type of scale, a Bismarck and a de Gaulle will always
be more effective than a Monnet, a Hallstein, or an Erhard. (Haas
1967, 328)
Neofunctionalism was dead… for the time being.
Second Theoretical Surge: Why? On Origin and Survival
Many factors were at work to account for the renaissance of regionalism
after the failure of the two first waves. Among these factors, the end of the
Cold War and huge economic changes were paramount. In showing that
adaptation to the new scenario was possible — and preferable to rejection
or isolation (Fawcett 1995), the then European Economic Community was
often taken as a model for other regions.
Table 1. Spillover family
Scope of authority
Increased Unchanged Decreased
Level of authority Increased Spillover Buildup Retrench
Unchanged Spillaround Encapsulation Spillback
Decreased Muddle about Spillback Spillback
Source: Own elaboration based on Schmitter (1969).
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According to mainstream theories, the first necessary factor for integration
is a demand condition (Mattli 1999), whether called economic interdepen-
dence (Moravcsik 1998) or increasing transnational activism (Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet 1998). The second necessary factor — but allegedly, like the
former, not sufficient — is a supply condition (Mattli 1999), i.e., either insti-
tutional arrangements or regional leadership by a powerful state, or both.
Notably, this sequence has been often inverted in Latin America. For instance,
interdependence among the Mercosur countries had been declining for some
years by the time the first steps toward integration were taken, and only started
to rise from then on (Hurrell 1995). Research has shown that, under certain
circumstances, supply conditions have accounted for origin, relaunching, and
initial success — but also for stalemate or reversal (Perales 2003; Malamud
2005). The literature on the causes of Latin American integration initiatives
can be classified according to two criteria: locus — whether the focus is on
domestic or foreign factors — and substance — whether the motivations are
mainly political or economic. This results in a four-fold typology.
Domestic political explanations claim that regime type, namely democ-
racy, is a necessary condition, as it influences the kind of link that countries
develop with one another. As the argument goes, failure in the 1960s and
1970s, as well as hibernation between the 1970s and 1980s, was due to
democracy breakdown and the predominance of authoritarian rule. Hence,
the third wave of democratization is seen as the trigger of the third wave of
regionalism (Dabène 2009). Empirical evidence has been displayed to
show how democracy accounts for greater cooperation among countries
(Schmitter 1991). Other studies call into question this argument with
statistical data (Remmer 1998). Surprisingly, these conflicting assertions are
defended with evidence derived from the same region: the Southern Cone.
Gardini (2005) has gone a step further, arguing that it was neither democ-
racy nor autocracy that led to cooperation in Mercosur but regime asymme-
try. Although democracy cannot be definitely proven as a condition for
integration, the aim of preventing its reversal was at the root of many
democratizing rulers’ decision to cooperate with their neighbors. The less
potential for interstate militarized conflict, the less necessity to sustain large
military budgets; and the less resources at hand for the military, the less
threat they would pose to democracy. Peace was seen as supportive of
democracy rather than the other way round. And regional cooperation was
the master key to peace.
Domestic economic explanations have focused on liberalization as the
main engine behind increased regional cooperation. Latin American govern-
ments that decided to open up their national markets, liberalize trade and
attract foreign investment saw regional agreements as tools to lock in domes-
tic reforms (Haggard 1997). On the other hand, Milner emphasizes domestic
features as a hindrance rather than backing for international cooperation.
She claims that ‘failure to consider domestic politics explicitly will lead IR
scholars and policy makers to be overly optimistic about cooperation among
nations and to be unable to understand the terms of cooperative agreements
made’ (Milner 1997, 234).
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External political explanations look at extra-regional actors, usually
powerful states or international organizations, that intervene in a given
region with a view to organizing it politically to serve the external actor’s
goals. Cases in point are the United States’ thrust behind the creation and
early success of the CACM (Schmitter 1970; Mattli 1999) and the current
efforts by the European Union to consolidate integration processes in Latin
America and elsewhere either actively — seeking to export regionalism
through funding and technical assistance — or passively — by offering itself
as role model for other blocs (Freres and Sanahuja 2005; De Lombaerde and
Schulz 2009). For the so-called ‘external federator’, the means are usually
economic but the ends are ideological or geopolitical.
Finally, external economic explanations emphasize systemic pressures
towards regionalization. Gómez-Mera (2005) claims that the emergence and
endurance of regional cooperation has been shaped by overlapping dynamics
of unequal power within a highly asymmetrical and increasingly globalized
international system. In turn, Phillips (1999, 72) professes to have identified
a new model of regional capitalist development emerging in the region and
claims that ‘the foreign policies of Latin American countries have followed
the same pattern, and in many ways have been tailored to complement the
new orientation of economic strategies’. Convergence regarding economic
models and subordination of foreign policy to economic policy were, follow-
ing her argument, at the basis of the regionalizing efforts.
The works analyzed above exhibit one commonality and one disagree-
ment. The commonality is that most, if not all, refer to regional cooperation
rather than integration as the dependent variable. The disagreement regards,
more obviously, the disparate variety of explanations that are postulated as
independent variable (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002; Tussie 2009). Democra-
tization, liberalization, interregionalism or globalization are thus called on,
sometimes to explain the thrust towards regionalism and others to account
for its reversal.
Second Theoretical Surge: How? On Operation and Evolution
As Mattli (2005, 328) pointed out, ‘the signing of an integration treaty
does not establish integration’. The factors that induce countries to enter
regional associations are rarely the same as those that persuade them not
to leave, as the latter include path dependency and sunk costs. Once coun-
tries are locked in, however, different dynamics might take place. Some are
reproductive and do not change the nature of the association, whereas
some could be transformative and change even the nature of the participant
units. The Euro is a case in point: once a state relinquishes its national
currency, a policy reversal is very costly. In Latin America the literature
could be divided according to whether significant transformations are
perceived (e.g. constructivism) or denied (e.g. intergovernmentalism). In
between lie a series of approaches that focus on the relation between
domestic features and regional processes in order to explain the dynamics
of integration.
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Constructivist accounts allege that interests and identities are not given but
socially constructed. Therefore, they focus on learning processes and the
building of security communities, understood as regions in which a large-scale
use of violence has become very unlikely or even unthinkable (Deutsch et al.
1957) and in which member states share common norms, values and political
institutions which uphold a common identity (Kacowicz 1998, 11). Although
Latin American efforts at integration have always emphasized common
history and culture, Haas (1967, 333) originally saw identity commonalities
as irrelevant at best: ‘Europe is divided by language and religion, but united
by regionally similar social and economic conditions and institutions; Latin
America is united merely by language and religion.’ More recently, however,
growing attention has been given to processes not accounted for by rationalist
explanations (Hurrell 1998; Oelsner 2003). As the argument goes, increasing
flows of people and communications are likely to nurture a regional aware-
ness. For instance, Gómez-Mera (2005, 135) argues that a common identity
has emerged in Mercosur, and that by providing ‘a stable and predictable
framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures and establishing regu-
larised patterns of interaction, regional institutions have promoted increased
enmeshment, internalisation and socialisation among bureaucratic actors in
each country … [thus] contributing to deepening their commitment to the
project’.
Liberal intergovernmental analysis has also got a foothold in the region.
Sánchez Sánchez (2009) has adapted Moravcsik’s framework for Central
America as the region features two characteristics that distinguish it from the
European experience. First, domestic politics and regional interdependence
do not play a central role in the process of preference formation: due to under-
development and external dependence, civil society is weak and the role of
the state and its elites ends up reinforced. Second, the systemic environment
and structural constraints are more influential, turning integration into a
defensive reaction that depends strongly on extra-regional actors — mainly
the US (Sánchez Sánchez 2009, 178). In short, ‘regional integration has less
to do with managing interdependence [and] more to do with creating condi-
tions for convergence and co-operation’ (Sánchez Sánchez 2009, 181). As a
consequence, the role of institutions has been limited. After having initially
raised the interest of the neofunctionalists, Central America has scored high
lately as a template for intergovernmentalism. The latter, however, takes a
less liberal shape than in the EU, as state preferences are molded by traditional
power elites rather than by market or civil society actors. Also in Mercosur,
domestic social actors have been low-profile and major interstate bargainings
have not led to the transfer of sovereignty to regional institutions. In sum,
‘extensive empirical research confirms the continued importance of extra-
and intra-regional power asymmetries in explaining the emergence and
nature of regionalism’ (Gómez-Mera 2008, 302).
The contributions dealing with the interrelation between domestic features
and regional processes can be classified according to their focus on govern-
mental institutions, legal systems or civil society. Governmental institutions,
particularly the executive format, have been credited for allowing such
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occurrences as the early success of Mercosur and the relaunching of CAN,
both in the 1990s. They took place in spite of minimal levels of previous inter-
dependence or effective regional institutions. To account for this puzzle,
Malamud (2005) has shown that the operation of Mercosur rested on presi-
dential diplomacy. This mechanism, understood as political, summit diplo-
macy as opposed to institutionalized, professional diplomacy, consists of
resorting to direct negotiations among the national presidents whenever a
crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved. Its regional
outcome has been called interpresidentialism (Malamud 2003), that is the
outcome of combining an international strategy, presidential diplomacy,
with a domestic institutional structure, presidential democracy. It goes
beyond political will as it is based on the political systems of the member
states, which by endorsing presidential intervention have sustained the
processes of regional integration in the absence of social demand.
Duina (2006) argues that the internal structure and legal nature of
regional organizations — or, in his words, regional trade agreements —
depend on the type of law, either common or civil, that prevails in most
member states. If common law predominates, as in NAFTA, a minimalist
approach is likely to take place: it means a reactive, case-by-case and grad-
ual approach to regulation. If civil law preponderates, as in the EU and
Mercosur, a more intrusive approach is expected: it entails a propensity for
a comprehensive and definitive codification of reality. Although Duina over-
looks the fact that in Mercosur all laws are national, as regional norms are
invalid until transposed into the legislation of all member states, his study
illuminates a domestic dimension that could cause an impact on regional
operation. The author underlines the influence of ideational factors at the
expense of hegemony and state power; however, it is reasonable to wonder
whether it is ‘most states’ or rather ‘core states’ that determine the nature of
a region. The latter case runs against Duina’s argument and back into the
governmentalist perspectives he criticizes.
Grugel (2006) has explored the argument that new regionalism represents
an opportunity for transnational civil society activism. Through a compari-
son of processes of collective action in the FTAA and Mercosur, she shows
that the influence of civil society actors in regionalist governance is extremely
limited ‘due to persistent institutional barriers to inclusion, the practical
obstacles for many groups of scaling up to the regional/transnational level
and the particular difficulties associated with accessing trade based negotia-
tions’ (Grugel 2006, 209). Hochstetler (2007) reaches the same conclusion
by focusing on the other end of the decision-making process: the weakness
of the output structure — i.e. the limited relevance of Mercosur decisions.
As a consequence, ‘it is not surprising that regional social movements have
directed little time to this level of governance’ (Hochstetler 2007, 1). Her
conclusion goes beyond conventional scholarship, suggesting that civil
society and social movements have had a weak impact on regional
organizations not only because they lack access but rather because they lack
interest. Contrary to the European experience, where Brussels is seen as a
significant power site, the perceived irrelevance of Latin American regional
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organizations discourages social participation and reduces demand for
further integration.
Summing up, all approaches except constructivism converge on a similar
characterization of how integration processes operate. While transnational
transactors and supranational institutions, on a par with nation states, have
become crucial to explain the evolution of European integration, in Latin
America only states matter. Supply-side integration may be market-oriented
as in Mercosur or elite-driven as in Central America, but it is always sover-
eignty-protective rather than sovereignty-sharing. This supports the early
Haas’s propositions rather than his middle-aged thoughts: once integration
has started, chief executives may be influential but often in a negative manner;
it takes técnicos rather than políticos to bring about functional spillovers.
Stepping Forward? The Lessons of Latin American Integration
From early on, Latin America became a laboratory to test hypotheses
drawn from the European experience. There are at least five issues in which
European-based theories have been tested: their generalizability outside the
EU (‘the n = 1 problem’), the different dynamics of origin and operation,
the impact of domestic institutions, the timing of institutionalization, and
the nature of politicization.
Generalizability outside the EU
To speak of theories of European integration is as inappropriate as to speak
of theories of German politics or of American parties: theories are not case
studies but systematic explanations of general phenomena. However, the
singularity of the EU development has led analysts to discuss the problem of
n = 1 — i.e. the possibility of crafting a theory that only applies to one case
(Caporaso et al. 1997). A way to avert such situation has consisted of moving
away from integration to governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) — and from
international relations to comparative politics (Hix 1994), approaching the
EU by comparison with federal states (Sbragia 1992; Majone 2005).
However insightful this may be, it only solves half of the problem: it puts the
adjective — European — in comparative context, but it leaves the noun —
integration — in the dark. Comparative regional integration, not compara-
tive governance, is the only way to deal with the root phenomenon. And,
outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin America have integration attempts
and thinking developed so extensively across space and so consistently over
time. Without Latin America, n = 1 would not be a research problem but a
fact of life.
The Different Dynamics of Origin and Operation
The first approaches that promoted or sought to explain European integra-
tion were not fully sensitive to the contrast between birth and growth of
integration. Federalism focused on founding events and functionalism on
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ongoing processes. Only with the advent of neofunctionalism in Latin
America was the distinction between background conditions, conditions at
the time of union, and process conditions made (Haas and Schmitter 1964).
However, neofunctionalism remained more able to account for integration
dynamics after union, while liberal intergovernmentalism shed more light on
the initiation or relaunching of a regional organization. The analysis of the
Latin American experiences has confirmed the validity of this division of
labor among theories, showing that they are not rivals but rather comple-
mentary, depending on context and timing.
More recently, Warleigh-Lack (2010) has advanced an analytical frame-
work that focuses on four dimensions: genesis, functionality, socialization
and impact of regional organizations. Genesis asks why states join — and stay
within — an integration process. Functionality investigates how a regional
organization functions once it is established. Socialization and impact, in
turn, study the outcome of the process, whether at ideational or material
levels. This typology resembles the one advanced here: the factors that
account for origin (and resilience), operation (and evolution), and outcomes
(either ideational or material) are not necessarily the same; therefore, no
single theory of integration is capable of explaining the whole process.
The Impact of Domestic Institutions
Direct presidential intervention has played a crucial role in both the start
and the development of every integration process on the continent, while
no equivalent figure to such supranational bargainers as Jean Monnet,
Robert Schuman or Jacques Delors is to be found — apart from Prebisch,
who was never invited to hold any supranational authority. The capacity of
presidential intervention to advance integration was not evident from the
outset. In CAN, the Andean Presidential Council was belatedly established
in 1990 but only consolidated in 1994. In CACM, Wynia early suggested
exploring ‘the effects of the national political roles of presidents on their
implementation of regional commitments’ (Wynia 1970, 331). However,
decades of political instability put this insight into question. Since the
1990s, though, democratization led to an increase in the impact made by
chief executives.
In the history of European integration, the most notorious interventions of
chief executives were those of De Gaulle in the 1960s and Thatcher in the
1980s, and both were detrimental to further integration. However, the neces-
sity to institutionalize the influence of national executives led to the belated
creation of the European Council in 1974, 20 years after the EEC was
founded. The Latin American cases show that, given certain institutional
settings, chief executives were the only available driver of integration. Presi-
dentialism, alongside power-oriented rather than rule-oriented political
traditions, has made a difference that EU pioneers could not have predicted.
However there is not enough evidence yet to tell whether these developments
challenge the neofunctionalist low-politics argument or, instead, support its
political spillover hypothesis.
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Timing of Institutionalization
The timing and sequence of institution-building can alter the effects produced
by institutions. For example, the early introduction of executive summits is
likely to reflect, but also feed, stronger intergovernmental procedures. In the
EU, the role played by the Court of Justice has been recognized as crucial in
pushing integration forward into unexpected, and often unintended, devel-
opments (Weiler 1994). The option for triadic (judicial) rather than dyadic
(diplomatic) institutionalization of dispute-settlement mechanisms distin-
guishes the EU from Mercosur and has shown greater spillover potential.
However, apparently similar institutional outlooks may conceal huge differ-
ences: even though CAN established a sophisticated institutional architecture
from its origins, member states’ reluctance to relinquish sovereignty prevented
the precocious regional institutions from generating spillover effects. As
Dominguez (2007, 127) stresses, ‘institutional design features have explained
little about the efficacy of organizations’. Although he adds that the key
exception has been automaticity, Table 2 shows that the momentous trans-
formations of subregional organizations took place after the establishment of
decision-making bodies involving the national presidents.
As CAN shows, regional integration may suffer from excessive or, at
least, precocious institutionalization — and not only from institutional defi-
cit, as some believe to be the case in the EU. Mercosur performed reason-
ably well in its first years precisely because it chose not to replicate the
strategy of the Andean Pact, which had tried to emulate the EU form instead
of process. Had Mercosur done the same, its ineffectiveness could have
eroded the legitimacy of the integration project as a whole. The underdevel-
opment of common institutions cannot persist for long if integration is to
move ahead, but reforms in their scope and authority must be timed with
regard to needs and perceptions (Malamud and Schmitter 2010). The
promoters of the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe could
have benefited from this lesson.
The Nature of Politicization
In the EU, politicization is understood as a process opposed to technical
management. Caporaso (1998, 347) argues that power has been downplayed
because ‘integration studies, as a field, has a “technicist” orientation’, but
also because of ‘the nature of the EC itself’. The mechanism through which
political leaders agree on general principles and leave the drafting of the
detailed rules to leading national and supranational technicians is known as
the ‘Messina method’. Both neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists
agreed on this definition, notwithstanding the focus of the former on techni-
cal management and of the latter on political preferences. In Latin America,
though, this conceptualization was only valid during the first theoretical
surge; afterwards, the technicians that had driven integration in LAFTA and
CACM waned and top politicians took charge. Since then, politicization has
been understood as opposed to institutional checks rather than to technical
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management. Whereas in Europe politicization meant democratizing and
taming regional agencies, in Latin America it meant not establishing them.
Nye (1965, 872) had early on warned of the risks of ‘premature overpoliti-
zation’, echoing Haas’s suggestion that high politics was inimical to integra-
tion. Although Haas later withdrew this argument, the Latin American
experiences have vindicated his earlier claims. EU students and practitioners
may want to take this issue into account when considering proposals regard-
ing such questions as common defense or joint representation in international
organizations.
A last lesson can be drawn. Several scholars fail to appreciate the nature
of the phenomenon by focusing on the adjective, regional, rather than the
noun, integration. The former indicates scope, not substance. The conven-
tional usage of the word Europe to refer to the EU tends to misdirect observers
from politics toward geography, culture or identity: this is a mistake, especially
when applied to ‘regions’ that are not organizations. For, as Latin America
teaches us, ‘natural’ regions can be dysfunctional for regional integration.
All the above further suggests three areas of research that EU studies could
profit from. The first regards disintegration; to date the EU has only seen
Greenland off, but never has a member state left. This might change, and the
CAN experience demands a better understanding of the conditions under
which it could happen and the effects it may produce. The second area
concerns informality and non-compliance; as the 2010 Greek tragedy shows,
deceit could be more harmful than open rejection of common rules. Scruti-
nizing any Latin American bloc would have sent an earlier wake-up call to
those who interpret rules at face value. The final research avenue leads to actor-
ness: EU officials have long fantasized about a world built on regions, in which
the EU would be both demiurge and role model. After analyzing the evolution
of Latin American regionalism, though, it seems wiser to recalibrate down-
wards the potential of interregionalism. Summing up, this is a call for more
realism and less complacency when studying integration from Europe.
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Notes
1. In 1984, ECLA was broadened to include the Caribbean countries and its acronym became ECLAC.
As this article emphasizes its previous work and influence, ECLA will be preferred throughout.
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